Kyrgyzstan (yes, one of those)

The US lacks decent supply routes into Afghanistan (it's landlocked, remember); meanwhile, President Obama has already begun to order many more troops moved into the region, which is still suffering heavily from Taliban attacks. One route goes through the Khyber Pass from Pakistan, but in recent months Pakistan has become more tolerant of the Taliban organization which has set up in the northwestern villages, so that route is coming under heavy attack. The only major airbase supply route is in the northern country of Kyrgyzstan, called Manas (after a legendary national hero who united the tribes against the Mongol hordes),

It appears that the Russians offered the Kyrgyzstanis a $2.15 billion package earlier this year to kick the Americans out of Manas airbase. No doubt they will use this as leverage in negotiations against the missile shield in Eastern Europe. At the same time, it seems that Mr. Obama, in a formerly secret letter to President Medvedev, has offered to give up the missile shield in return for Russia abandoning its nuclear financial and technological aid to Iran.

This seems the height of folly. It swaps a temporary setback for Iran (which will continue to press forward in nuclear technology with or without Russia's help) in return for a permanent setback for the US (which will leave Europe undefended from long-term future Iranian attacks, Russian attacks, or anyone else's attacks). In consequence it shows Russia that underhanded power-politics works, that the US is weak and irresolute, and perhaps most importantly of all, it injures the trust that we have earned in Eastern Europe, which depends upon us to keep the Russians in check; when we show our ignorance of Russian diplomatic methods and the absence of backbone, they will begin to transfer their trust to the EU. NATO itself may be threatened (I know that already France and Germany are in major disagreement with the US about policy, for instance over inducting Georgia into the alliance system).

Considering this background, it seems that leaving the airbase just as we are doing is part of the same weakness of will and blinkered foreign policy focusing exclusively on the immediate problems in Iran and Afghanistan.

Now, it may be IN FACT that allowing Russia to exercise dominance of Central Asia is the most prudent policy, because it may satisfy its imperial ambitions in the medium-term, thus keeping pressure off of Eastern Europe. Also, China is interested in expanding its power, and may clash with Russia (both nations apparently have been conducting joint wargames with the Asian countries, including special-forces operations). But this outlet for Russian ambition would be made terribly dangerous if China and Russia were to form an Asian alliance. Someone should figure out the likelihood of this event.

But I think it more prudent, as a rule of course, to show Russia that they cannot exert control over this region, or anyother, most especially with such obvious ploys like the one over Manas, in which absolutely no Russian interest is served except that America is hurt. In fact, Russia is hurt by it also. When a militaristic state can only afford an (openly acknowledged) military budget of $50 billion, $2.15 billion as a diplomatic bribe hurts a lot. If they end up paying it, but their purpose is nevertheless totally defeated, they lose money and face. That ought to be our goal.

This is far and away the best analytic article (and short, too) that I have found on Manas, and asserts the Americans can find cheaper supply routes elsewhere. But we should not only find cheaper supply routes. We should secure so many of them that we show Russia to be impotent in regards to our foreign policy.

Though the article gives the right solution, it glosses over the central problem: Manas is not about supply routes, but about politics with Russia. I think the best analogy is to think of Russia building a blockade in our path. If we can blow up the blockade, great. If we can go around it more cheaply, and come out stronger than ever, better.