Change of Venue

I'm now blogging at The American Conservative.

The Virtue of Shame

Emily Maynard vs Guarding Your Heart. Another ship lines up a broadside against that rotten barge. Mostly good stuff, though Emily goes too far when she says that "shame and vulnerability are antithetical concepts; they cannot coexist." Shame, far from being destructive of sincere relationships, is crucial to them. It is a capacity to regard and to fear the judgment of others. It's a form of social moral reasoning that operates where the individual fails to reason for himself, and it functions just as much between two lovers as it does between a gathering of neighbors at a bar or a parade of activists at a march.

Emily speaks from a Christian subculture in which shame still operates. The particular moral reasoning of the Guard Your Heart tradition is wrong-headed, as she shows. And yet it is regrettable that outside that subculture, shame, especially sexual shame and the shame surrounding familial piety, has lost most of its power, and to the extent that it is still regarded as a substantial threat to practicing of all kinds of moral perversions, appears only as an object of derision.
Moderation! The dialectic of both...and, rather than either...or.
Roger Scruton is excellent on shame.
Keep in mind the background of Scruton's thinking, which is that personal identity is fulfilled through a pre-political experience of membership in a community:
"Man can set his feet on the ladder of self-realisation only when he has some perception of its reliability, and this cannot be achieve by subjective fiat. He must first find himself at home in the world, with values and ambitions that are shared. We must first be able to perceive the ends of his activity not in himself but outside himself, as proper aims in a public world, endowed with a validity greater than the validity of a mere 'authentic' choice."
(Scruton, but NOT from the essay on stigma, citation unknown)

Bad Apples and False Marketing

I want to arrive at the following conclusion, but I need help with the arguments getting there, and help with appropriately precise language: that there is something unethical in selling a ten-month cold storage apple I can get at the average local supermarket that rots in three days, is half-filled with internal browning, tasteless, and contributes next to nothing for your health, to say nothing of the externalized side-effects of producing that apple.

The problem lies not so much in the condition of the apple and its poor quality, as in the implicit false representation, by the growers and the supermarket, that it is an apple of great quality, as demonstrated by its bright color and its homogenous, robust appearance. Those attractive characteristics did not appear by accident. It's a question, I think, of false marketing.

There is a distinction between lying and deceiving. The concept of a lie we generally reserve to a deception where the good of the other is erased from our calcuations, and frequently where we intend his harm. A deception has a wider scope, and can include a simple trick, or a falsehood that is for the other's benefit (deflecting curiosity about a surprise party, for example), or simply protecting the existence of a secret from an impertinent questioner. Nevertheless it still seems that a righteous deception has to possess an element of truth - a deceiving statement ought to be able to bear the true interpretation even if it isn't the plain sense of the words.

For this reason I'm hesitant to describe false marketing as actually immoral; I don't think it's a lie in the strong sense. Though the plain sense of the colorful shapely apple connotes health and well-being, the marketer can reply that the color does not actually denote anything. It's simply colorful; color is attractive to the eye, and increases sales.

Hence I use the term unethical, by which I'm trying to get at the conditions that underlie successful business relationships, which is a variety of friendship, a simplistic friendship where each party finds the other useful. One of those conditions is veracity - truthfulness, plain speaking. Marketing's proper role is to make a product appealing to the consumer, and to make the activity of shopping pleasant. It goes beyond its role when it conceals imperfections in a product, to offer it for more than it's worth by implying something about the functionality of the product is true when it isn't.

An Austrian will tell you that everything is revealed in the price. If its a crappy apple, it'll sell for a low price. Good apples are expensive, and you'd cheat the world of apples if you insisted that supermarkets only sell great apples. Bad apples are what they are because that's what the market has settled on.

But I'm not going to respond to that argument quite yet, though to dispute the Austrian on his own grounds you might take up the themes of the ethics of information exchange, and the distinction between long-term equilibriums and short-term disequilibriums. And there are other ways to counter the argument.

Prudential Reasoning

If the Millennial Generation is fed up with politics, that is because they believe, rightly or wrongly, that modern politics is divorced from prudential deliberation, slavishly tied to personal success at the expense of the community. The young people are, however, extremely interested in prudential reasoning, and that is the way to talk to them. Apply moral philosophy to their personal problems, and build up to reasoning about community life.

But begin by treating your own problems. This is what I learned from Mark Helprin's novels: aim at beautiful action, and don't be afraid of radical solutions to distressing obstacles.

Don't kid yourself you have properly answered political questions when you have expounded an ideal. Supplement Plato with Aristotle. Roger Scruton does this sort of thing admirably. I recommend his A Political Philosophy: Arguments for Conservatism as an example of practical philosophy.

Fees, and Mark Helprin

No matter what the customer service rep on the other end of the line says, fees are always negotiable. I mentally treat a fee merely as a high bid for my custom, and asking them to waive the fee is rejecting that initial bid. The standard line you want to give them is 'this is important for my future business with you', but 'this is my first time using this service' also helps. If the rep can't help or refuses to help, ask nicely to speak to a manager. I saved $50 today this way booking my airline ticket.

Sometimes they are trained to withhold access from managment, and won't initially transfer you; insist on speaking to a manager. If that manager won't help you, and you have the patience, insist on speaking to his manager. Someone somewhere in the chain of command has the authority to help you and the wish to please customers. If literally no one will help you, do business with someone else. And use your story with the next business.

If the manager you spoke to was efficient and helpful, get his or her name. I feel that a brief email to the company expressing your thanks for that person's help is warranted and humane.

----

"So tell me where that other quarter point comes in," Mr. Edgar ordered.

"Asset rental and leasing, prepaid charges not accountable as reimbursements, and fees."

"Fees!" thundered Mr. Edgar. "Fees!"

"Yes sir."

"How many points?" he demanded.

"An eighth of a point, sir."

"Asses! he said. "Fees! No one questions them. They take advantage of people's lifetimes of passivity, their years of education and molding. There are two kinds of creature in the jungle--the tiger and the iguana. The tiger sets the fees, and the iguana pays them. I wantmore fees."

"Arbitrarily, sir?"

"What the hell do you think a fee is, Nichols?" he screamed at Nichols. "Do we have transaction fees?"

"On what?"

"On everything."

"No."

"Levy transaction fees. And maintenance fees. And fees for opening an account, closing an account, having less than three accounts, and having more than two accounts. I want to see late charges, early charges, and surcharges on other charges. I want a fee for foreign accounts, a fee for domestic accounts, and a fee for accounts subject to audits. You get the picture? Gradually double or triple these fees over a period of two or three years, and index them to inflation. Institute a contact fee, a telephone charge, a bookkeeping adjustment charge, a flotation fee, a sinking fee, and, you, Nichols, go to the New York Public Library and--I don't care how long it takes--find five fees that no one has ever heard of. Look especially hard into Babylonia, the Sumerians, Byzantium, and the Holy Roman Empire. Those guys knew what they were doing, and they had balls."

"But Mr. Edgar, we'll drive away our customers."

"No we won't. Just be prepared to drop the fees of any customer who appears to be making good on a threat to leave, and increase those on the ones who stay put. It never fails."

"Yes sir."

When Mr. Edgar left the River Club that evening, he was--although not immediately--several hundred million dollars richer. He returned ten percent of that to charity, and for this he was universally acclaimed. As he said, there are two kind of creature in the jungle: the tiger and the iguana. The tiger sets the fees, and the iguana pays them.

Mark Helprin, Memoir From Antproof Case

In my beginning is my end

Civilization is in the family, love is in the home, life is in the genes, freedom is in duty. And yet merely to remain at home, to follow your genes, to be obedient to your duty, is merely to dwell, to feel, to reproduce, and to hope. Which of you is satisfied with that? A man finds what he is looking for only after he abandons it. Only he who loses his life will find it, yea, there is not even time to bury your father. In a timeless universe, still, and complete, where nature and end are the same thing, there is no possibility, there is no need of a journey. But bloody Chaos and Old Night have severed phusis from telos. The higher things lie at the end of time, after a sacrifice, after a death. We go to bring back from beyond the grave, from the clutches of Pluto, the beauty that was torn from us, and restore the beauty to the broken form. Yet at the end of journey the beauty turns ghostly, our hands clutch empty air, and we go back to the beginning, an old heart heavy with sadness. But step over the threshold, what do you see? A mother in blue, and a mewling baby. Another hand, stronger than death, has brought back civilization, love, life, freedom, because greater than any of these things, and worthier of desire.

Dialogue on Subjectivity and Objectivity, or, How I Learned to Do Battle With Immanuel Kant

This is a minor paraphrase and distillation of an interesting Facebook conversation I had some time ago. Names changed.

Status

Henry is trying to be relatively objective.

John

It's impossible to know whether you are being objective, because you would first have to be objective before you could objectively determine your objectivity.

Henry

The question is, can we be completely objective, or simply more objective than we were previously? If the latter, then we would be relatively objective.

Matthew

Are we always observers? Yes. Are our observations coloured by our position and our previous experiences? Yes. Is what we observe real rather than fake? Yes. So there is wisdom and folly, experience and ignorance, reason and unreason, but there is no sound contradistinction between subjectivity and objectivity.

John

In answer to your question, Henry, it depends on the possibility of objectivity. Your ability to answer the question "can we be completely objective?" depends on being objective enough to answer the question.

Henry

Then how can we know the amount of objectivity we have? Or can we not?!

Matthew

Henry, I have just one word of advice for you, and two axioms; what follows from them you must find on your own.

Don't try to distinguish between objectivity and subjectivity. You will be forced in the end to deny one or the other entirely, and then you will have lost everything.

Aristotle: There is nothing in the intellect which was not first in the senses.

Aquinas: Being and good are convertible terms.

Henry

Thank you! I will think on those things, and see where the implications lead.

John

To me, the discussion of objectivity comes much later in the epistemological "time-line". We have to construct our perspectives on things that are true, that we know to be true, regardless of our degree of objectivity. Self-existence, the laws of logic, and other a priori knowledge is not changed by the degree of objectivity. Thus, in a way, two perspectives or "ways of thinking about the world" develop in each person. We cannot found everything we think about on pure reason, I'm not saying that. But every thought that we have a posteriori must be compared to the perspective of pure reason. Our lack of objectivity does not change the fact that we can know that 2+2=4, for example.

Henry

That makes sense. I still have questions about how this would play out practically in one's mind, but I can try to figure them through.

Matthew

Actually, John, that's an incorrect statement of fact. The distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge in fact comes later than the discussion of objectivity and subjectivity (the latter not in those terms, but for sure implicit). The discussion of objectivity/subjectivity really gets going after Descartes. Once Decartes introduced the idea that a philosopher had to have mathematical certainty to call a thing knowledge, you had many saying many things, including Hume, in 1740, that "power and necessity...are...qualities of perceptions, not of objects...felt by the soul and not perceived externally in bodies." Immanuel Kant introduced the a priori/a posteriori distinction to rescue certainty from Hume's critique.

You say we can know 2+2=4. But I don't think that's the kind of objective knowledge Henry is interested in.

John

I'm not talking about the historical "time-line" of epistemology. I'm talking about the "time-line" as in the mental, internal process of how we come to know things.

I'm not postulating that mathematical knowledge is necessary as a basis for any other kind of knowledge. I'm saying that mathematical knowledge is an example of objective knowledge.

My point (and this is the reason I used the phrase "to me" meaning that this is my position: not quoting from a book) is that it is unfruitful to ask the question "am I being objective in reference to this thought?" until one has a epistemic foundation of absolute certainty, by which to critique the degree of objectivity regarding the thought. In the same way that a person would need to know the truth about a situation to know if a person were telling the truth or not about the situation.

On the subject of the mental time-line, what I mean is that "in the real-time process of making truth claims about external facts and internal mental processes" the question of objectivity can only be asked (or only becomes a useful question) if one has truth (beyond critique) about the thing under consideration. This point is simply that no one can know if he/she is being objective (about anything) unless he/she first knows that he has/knows truth relevant to the topic that would be unaffected by the degree ofobjectivity.

A person born blind has no concept of color.

Matthew

Thanks for clarifying. Nevertheless, it seems to me that in your own understanding as expressed in your statements here, you are using other people's ideas: you are using the notion of a priori as a defense against the possibility that we are always merely subjective, which is just what Kant did.

I think you are quite right to say that we can only claim objectivity if we have true knowledge beyond critique of the matter at hand. You are also right to say that we cannot have pure objectivity about everything. But I would warn you that the search for meaningful objective knowledge is a hopeless one. The bulk of Kant's magnificent achievement I think (and most scholarship would agree with me) does not survive the critique of the linguistic subjectivists. Try deducing the material world from objective knowledge, or God, or love. Also if you dig deeply enough, you will discover that Descartes' famous proof of his self-existence itself depends on a fallacy, and that the rules of classical logic themselves are capable of being logically broken in certain special circumstances. The search for objectivity leads to despair. I don't recommend it.

John

I don't understand what you mean when you say "The bulk of Kant's magnificent achievement I think does not survive the critique of the linguistic subjectivists." or " Try deducing the material world from objective knowledge, or God, or love." Could you explain? I'm not asking you to prove anything, I just need to understand what you are saying before I know if I agree or disagree.

I don't see how Descartes proof logically breaks down. It's acctually a very simple, in some ways, empirical, inferential statement.

I agree that the search for *complete* objectivity leads to despair (complete as in universal for all things or comprehensive for any one thing) No one can overcome all bias. However, my point has been that there are some things we can know (actually, a lot of things), the validity of which *cannot* be changed regardless of our bias and I used mathematics as an example of this. That's why I was saying that a discussion of objectivity is only significant if you can first establish that you know things, for certain, about the matter at hand. We may disagree regarding how much can be known in this way of it can really be known beyond critique, but that is a very long discussion that is almost impossible to carry out in hypothetical and abstract formats.

Matthew

The cogito can be attacked in two directions:

1) it assumes that "whatever thinks, exists." But this assumption does not resist the perfect doubt that Descartes applied to his knowledge before he looked for what he had left.

2) It presupposes the existence of "I". Descartes begs the question in the very terms of the argument. He should rather have said, "thinking is occuring." But there is no way to get from this statement to an "I."

Interestingly, Descartes himself anticipated these arguments. That is why he reformulated the position in a later book of his, the Meditations. He writes, "after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that the proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind." Here he makes clear that he is not inferring from one statement to another. Rather, in the act of thinking, the proposition, "I exist" is clear and distinct in his mind.

In other words, he has No Ability to doubt such an idea. The 'clear and distinct' grounds for knowledge is one of his best contributions to philosophy. It works especially well in mathematics, and to know 2+2=4 is to know 'objectively' precisely because the idea is Obvious to us, and to any rational person who thinks about it.

But how can we know that what is clear and distinct to us is really true? Descartes also recognized this problem. He writes later in the Meditations that God guarantees the truth of clear and distinct ideas, because God is not a deceiver. And yet he proves the existence of God by an appeal to the clarity and distinctness of certain ideas. This is a circular, fallacious argument.

I am not well-versed in nineteenth and twentieth century philosophy. However, I know that the Vienna School logical positivists' attack on the meaningfulness of language itself has destroyed the possibility of an absolute undoubtable certainty with regards to the relationship between our perceptions and the moral, spiritual, and material world we perceive.

I challenge you demonstrate to me a single moral truth which does not depend upon one or more assumptions that I can theoretically, even reasonably, doubt.

If you want objectivity, you are going to have throw out Descartes criteria of doubtlessness. You are going to have to redefine it. There are good ways of doing this. But I think the old quest has already been show to end in failure. The task of twentieth century philosophy was to demonstrate this, and to show us how to live with this unfortunate fact. With its eyes now opened, this is where twenty-first century philosophy must start from.

Finally, even if you have a small body of perfectly objective knowledge, what are you going to do with everything that stands outside that body? You will be forced to concede that it is merely subjective. Do you want that? Or will you say that other things like the material world, love, God, are a mixture of subjectivity and objectivity? In that case we must surely be able to sift between them, and then we are back where we started.

Henry

Okay, I feel bad for not contributing to this conversation since it is on my status. What you're saying is a bit over my head for me to add to, but it is good, and I can learn from what you're discussing.

Matthew

I hope you can learn something. This discussion really shouldn't be on your wall. We're using short-hand words and phrases to indicate whole arguments. Unless you're familiar with the 'code', as it were, you won't be able to follow our arguments. That's not your fault.

Henry

Well, I can look up the short-hand words and phrases. Though perhaps condensed, it is not fruitless in this medium.

Charles

Matthew, have you ever heard of the concept of a 'philosophical axiom'. A foundational assumption which simply exists? It seems like you're asking for a moral statement that depends on a philosphical axiom; a good and solid one which can't be doubted.

"I challenge you demonstrate to me a single moral truth which does not depend upon one or more assumptions that I can theoretically, even reasonably, doubt."

I would argue that elements of morality are one of those philosophical axioms. You want a moral truth that doesn't not depend upon an assumption that can be doubted, but what if the moral truth itself was an assumption that one could not reasonably doubt? Have you considered the possibility that a, I'm not saying which, statement about morality could be one beyond reasonable doubt? A foundation itself?

Matthew

Charles, thank-you for your challenge. But you have mistaken my intent. I made that challenge to John (and it remains open) because it washe who claimed that 'objectivity' depended upon having an "epistemic foundation of absolute certainty". I have denied that such a condition is possible, but I have nowhere asserted any criteria of my own.

But since you draw me out so well, I will tell you just a little of what I think. It so happens I do not think that absolute certainty can be founded on 'epistemic' grounds. I think it must be founded on metaphysical grounds, which is precisely what you suggest. The first axiom is: Being Is. The universe really exists. Being Is Not Nothing. The second axiom is: Being Is Good. This is of course also a moral truth, which is also just what you suggest. There are many truths which follow from these. But there is also the interesting mental 'time-line' that shows that we are led up to these axioms.

They are not Obvious to us until we learn them. As children we did not know them, even as grown men they are not obvious until after a great deal of study. This reveals something marvelous: man has the capacity to receive the knowledge of axiomatic truth through his experiences - through his senses, to be precise. And that means there is something in every man which is essentially trustworthy. This thing we call his reason. The capacity of the mind to know, and the capacity of the world to be known, have a relationship called 'truth'. That is why logicians say that truth is always 'in' the mind. Truth is the mind's stance towards the world. To know a true thing is to be able to see it properly. This is clearly both objective and subjective at the same time. That is why I don't like the false distinction between the two. I would rather speak of knowledge and ignorance, reason and unreason, wisdom and folly.

Henry

Okay, I want to read through this, and if possible add to it, but at the moment I am snowed under with homework. However, I will (Lord willing), come back to this, decifer it, and go from there.

Charles

"This reveals something marvelous: man has the capacity to receive the knowledge of axiomatic truth through his experiences - through his senses, to be precise."

By this statement, don't you forfeit what it is to be an axiomatic truth? If it requires any logical process, then it's not an axiom. We all know experience alone cannot bring truth, but rather there has to be some sort of critical thought behind the experience. If it is a thing known through experience, that means that your axioms are not axioms at all.

How can you have a metaphysic without beginning with an axiom?

Matthew

Tell me, could just any 12-year-old independently come up with the axioms of Euclid? Could a 20-year-old? Could a 40-year-old? No, I think. To discover them it took genius plus a mind devoted the study of mathematics.

I do not say that we are led up to an axiom by a 'logical process', but though our experiences, by our senses, in our reason. I say that if axioms are axioms, then they are built into the structure of the world, and that to know them (not just accept them as the 12 year old does, but really know them) we live in the world, and let our senses lead us up to them, since we cannot see them at first, but once we see them, they explain everything else. Does the sight of a palace prove a king? No, but it suggests it. The sight of a guard in livery? The sight of his attendants? No again, but one is led towards the great truth, and so sees the king, and all before is made clear, though you could never have derived the king from a logical process of your former sights.

All this is pure Aristotle. Allow me to quote at length from Book I Chapter 4 of the Nichomachean Ethics, translated by Joe Sachs:

"And let it not escape our notice that arguments from first principles differ from those that go up toward first principles. For Plato rightly raised this question, and used to inquire whether the road is from first principles or up to first principles, just as, on a race course, the run is either from the judges to the boundary or back again. One must begin from what is known, but this has two meanings, the things known to us and the things that are known simply.* Perhaps then we, at any rate, ought to begin from the things that are known to us. That is why one who is going to listen adequately to discourse about things that are beautiful and just, and generally about things that pertain to political matters, needs to have been beautifully brought up by means of habits. For the primary thing is that something is so, and if this is sufficiently evident, there is no additional need for the reason why. And such a person either has or easily gets hold of the things that come first. If one niether has them nor has it in him to get hold of them, let him harken to Hesoid:

"Altogether best is he who has insights into all things,

But good in his turn is he who trusts one who speaks well.

But whoever neither himself discerns, nor harkening to another,

Lays to heart what he says, that one for his part is a useless man."

Sachs' footnote: "* In Bk. I, Chap. 1 of the Physics and at 1029b 3-12 of the Metaphysics, Aristotle discusses this distinction at more length. What is "known to us" is first for us because it is familiar, but it hardly deserves the name knowledge; what is "known" in the simple or proper sense comes last in the order of our inquiry, but is first in the order of things, making everything else known. Dialectical inquiry begins where we are, rather than attempting prematurely to reason from clear and distinct first principles."

"Being is good" is likewise an axiom of this sort, standing square in the middle of Plato, Aristotle, and the Thomist tradition. But do you suppose everyone really knows it? Do you not know that a majority of the so-called philosophers of the twentieth century actually reject it? Do you happen to know that there are intelligent mathematicians who reject even the axioms of Euclid? So there are your axioms, gutted and left for the vultures by intelligent men.

They are only reached by the right sort of education. In other words, as I said before, we are led up to them through our experiences in our reason.

My epistemology comes from my metaphysics. But my metaphysics comes the vast intricacy of my relationship with the universe.

Finis. Hooray for Thomas Aquinas!